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Crisis: classical 
and recent analysis. 
A text guide
Analytical and empirical literature on crises is numerous. And the
complexity of the present crisis, with global components and
national specificities, financial causes amplified in their interaction
with other variables and feedback between Wall Street and Main
Street, makes Irving Fisher’s saying from 1933 as true as ever:
analysing «the» cycle and of course «the» crisis is a myth.
Here comes a summary of some classical (in the sense of being
previous to the present situation) and recent views that may offer
interpretative points and recommendations for policies with an
interest from the current perspective. Some of the most interesting
contributions are referred to and commented, sometimes with
opposed points of view, but often with comments allowing to
understand and tackle a delicate, complex situation as is the
present one.
JOAN TUGORES
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Readings of classics
John Maynard Keynes: 
Keynesian analysis and policies
Keynesian thought is fashionable again. The
difficulties market mechanisms are having to
quickly and automatically redress imbalance,
especially in recession, are at the origin of the
message that public authorities play an impor-
tant role in such situations. But Keynes’ original
texts have many shadings.
Some writings («pamphlets», as he liked to say)
included in his Essays in Persuasion were pub-
lished in the early 1930s. One of them, titled
«The Great Slump of 1930», starts in a way that
is fully valid today: «The world took long to
notice that we are living in the shadow of one
of the biggest economic disasters of modern
history this year. But now people on the street
have noticed what is occurring [...], they feel
overwhelmed by exaggerated fears; however,
when the first signs of concern came up earlier,
they did not experience what would have been
reasonable unrest [...]. Are they now awakening
from a sweet dream to face the darkness of
reality? Or are they falling asleep with a night-
mare that will pass?»
KEYNES, J. M. (1930). «The great slump of 1930». 
In: Essays in Persuasion. New York: Harcourt
Brace, 1932.
http://www.gutenberg.ca/ebooks/keynesslump/
keynes-slump-00-h.html
Translation into Spanish: «La Gran Depresión 
de 1930». In: Ensayos de persuasión. 
Barcelona: Ed. Crítica, 1998, p. 134-142.
The articles included in the Essays refer to the
role of insufficiency of private demand and how
its effects are deepened by price fall, that is, fearful
deflation. The dramatic increase of unemployment
figures, the potential role of expansive policies –
basically regarding anything related with public
investment projects – estimates of the potential
«multiplying» effect of such action on economic
activity, etc. shares the same text with an interest-
ing analysis of 1931 showing the effect of multi-
plying, now downward mechanisms of asset
price reduction on the balance sheet of banks
and their capacity to provide financing.
KEYNES, J. M. (1931). «The Consequences to the
Banks of the Collapse of Money Values». 
In: Essays in Persuasion. New York: Harcourt
Brace, 1932. 
Translation into Spanish: «Consecuencia del
hundimiento de los valores monetarios en el
sistemabancario». In: Ensayos de persuasión.
Barcelona: Ed. Crítica, 1998, p. 157-165.
Another quotation might describe the fears in
autumn 2008: «And now, in most of the world,
the position of banks, though hidden from
public view, may in fact be the weakest part in
the whole situation [...]. If nothing is done, critical
default will occur in banks all over the world.»
This could be a warning having led Ben
Bernanke, one of the best scholars of propaga-
tion mechanisms in the 1929 crisis before
becoming president of the Federal Reserve, to
clearly strive for rescuing the financial system
at any price.
In General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money (1936), famous Chapter 12 is noteworthy,
in which Keynes formulates the paramount
role of expectations and variables like confidence,
which are especially relevant in economies
with sophisticated financial systems. Appendix
A establishes a link between his theory and
other explanations of economic cycles, pro-
viding an excellent summary. The role given
to «delusion» of real return on investment
compared with the expected one as one of
the driving forces of cycles is also to be
pointed out.
KEYNES, J. M. (1936), General Theory of Employment,
Interest amd Money.
Translation into Catalan: Clàssics del Pensament
Modern, no. 35. Barcelona: Eds. 62, 1987.
Translation into Spanish: Mexico City: Fondo
de Cultura Económica, 1945.
Chap. 12: «The State of Long-term Expectation»
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http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/k/keynes/
john_maynard/k44g/chapter12.html
Chap. 22: «Notes on the Trade Cycle»
http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/k/keynes/
john_maynard/k44g/chapter22.html
The Austrian school: 
monetary and financial factors
The Austrian school, led by Ludwig von Mises
and Friedrich Hayek, is often presented as
rivalling Keynes, especially due to its trust in
automatic reaction without resorting to public
intervention, generally held to be counterpro-
ductive. However, there are interesting sides to
the Austrian explanation of cycles and crises
from a current point of view, specifically the
role given to monetary policies that support
interest rates artificially under their natural or
balanced level (a contrast also found in Scandi-
navian economist Knut Wicksell).
A consequence of this is induction to take
excessive risk, looking for investment offering
more profitability than that linked with current
interest rates, originating what some (even
the International Monetary Fund) have termed
«appetite for risk». Objective risks are underval-
ued, with unpleasant results when true «risk-
adjusted profitability» emerges from certain
investments. Following criticism of the action
of the Federal Reserve towards the end of the
Greenspan era, accused of keeping interest
rates artificially low for reasons explained later
on, this Austrian mechanism seems to be valid
again.
MISES, L. VON (1936): «La théorie dite autrichienne
du cycle économique». Bulletin de la Société Belge
d’Études et d’Expansion, 35:103, December, p. 459-
464.
http://www.liberte-cherie.com/a2910-La_Theo-
rie_dite_autrichienne_du_cycle_economique.html
Translation into Spanish: Revista Libertas XII, 43,
October 2005. Barcelona: Instituto Universitario
ESEADE. 
http://www.eseade.edu.ar/servicios/
Libertas/3_12_Mises_Teoria%20Austriaca.pdf
Irving Fisher: debt deflation
Another significant contribution is that of Irving
Fisher. Although he incorrectly considered in
early 1929 that the stock exchange could not
collapse (he lost most of his personal wealth
due to investment he made based on this con-
viction), in 1933 he published one of the most
interesting pieces of analysis ever written about
this subject (FISCHER, I., 1933). Fisher states the
diversity of factors converging in the deepest
crises such as the one that started in 1929, but
he quickly states that the core aspect is fragility
due to overborrowing induced by lax financial
conditions. Such overborrowing interacts with
an evolution of asset prices, first up and then
down, leading to recession and deflation that
makes it especially difficult to come out of
overborrowing. When positions are to be
undone through selling, the result is the loss in
the value of assets to be sold, with a negative
impact on the balance of involved organisa-
tions. It is a much more systematic and clearer
text than other classical documents as well as
worth reading from a present perspective.
Much attention is to be paid to points 1-4, 
15-24, 28-34 and 44-49 in the article.
FISHER, I. (1933): «Debt-deflation Theory of Great
Depression», Econometrica, 1, p. 337-357.
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/meltzer/fis-
deb33.pdf
Hyman Minsky: between classics and
modern times. Intrinsic instability?
Between 1950 and 1980, economic development
was much more placid, especially in advanced
economies, which created the feeling that
progress in stabilisation policies had managed
to control cycles. However, some analysts
insisted in the message of intrinsic instability of
capitalist economies, especially regarding their
financial systems. Among them is Hyman Min-
sky, who stands out thanks to his description of
how «important cycles are due to financial
attributes essential for capitalism». According to
him, this leads to a transition between hype
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and depression called the «Minsky moment».
Minsky studied how economic policies were
able to stabilise an unstable economy using
the title of one of his most relevant books (pub-
lished in 1986 and symptomatically reedited in
2008). Among Minsky’s contributions (MIN-
SKY, H.P., 1992) his typology of economic units
based on the relation between debt and income
is noteworthy; being valid to a certain extent, it
distinguishes between three categories. First,
what he calls «hedge financing units» that fulfil
their contractual duties with their cash flow.
Then there is speculative finance relying on
other sources such as asset appreciation. The
third category are units with «Ponzi financing»,
relying on new stakeholders entering the debt
pyramid. Do we need to give names of specific
examples of today? The degree of financial
 stability is associated to the combination of
these three types of positions.
MINSKY, H.P. (1992): «The Financial Instability
 Hypothesis». In: ARESTIS, Ph.; SAWYER, M.
(eds.).  Handbook of Radical Political Economy.
Working Paper, 74. Edward Elgar. Aldershot,
1993.
http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp74.pdf
Contemporary readings
Contemporary analysis combines, with a different
degree and emphasis, aspects related to the
 following concepts:
Own causes. E.g. credit and debt increase,
which led to relaxation or degradation of risk
assessment that triggered housing financing
even for debtors with a dubious record.
Causes of causes. They include artificially low
interest rates facilitated by the Federal Reserve.
In other countries like Spain, this has occurred
by means of lowering interest rates after entering
the euro.
Causes with a global scope. It is especially
generation of savings surplus in emerging
Asian economies (especially China) what has
contributed to creating a «global savings glut»
in Bernanke’s words, basically channelled to the
United States to look for top-quality financial
assets in order to make up for low household
savings.
Dissemination mechanisms. They range from
saving to leveraging segments in different
capacities: competition in the finance sector,
executive remuneration schemes, deregulation
and relaxation of supervision, etc. It also
includes risk distribution by means of innovative
financial instruments between market
 segments, between institutions and at interna-
tional level through elaborate, barely transparent
tools and the role of rating agencies.
Transition from expansion to crisis. Troubles
in reactivation, asset value loss, deterioration of
confidence, doubts on liquidity and solvency,
stagnation in markets.
Response, rescue and emergencies in the
finance sector. Systemic risks, credit crunch,
action on assets (toxic asset buying plans) and
liabilities (recapitalisation, possible public
 participation in capital).
One view that could be considered as being
representative of many such aspects is that of
Raghuram Rajan in collaboration with Douglas
Diamond. In 2005, being the head of research
at the International Monetary Fund, Rajan
explicitly warned by surprise of an increase in
financial fragility, rejecting «irrational compla-
cency» (an expression with which Krugman
added to Greenspan’s known term of «irra-
tional exuberance»).
In «The Credit Crisis: Conjectures about Causes
and Remedies», the authors explicitly refer to
the role of the «climate» in business, which has
turned it difficult to avoid gregarious behav-
iours, summarised in the famous saying of
Chuck Prince, chairman of Citigroup, who in
July 2007 declared: «When the music’s over,
things will become tough; but as long as the
music is played, we’ll have to keep dancing.
Change of cycle or change of model?222
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And we’re still dancing.» Soon after, the music
suddenly stopped.
DIAMOND, D. and RAJAN R. (2008): «The Credit
Crisis: Conjectures about Causes and Reme-
dies», written for the AEA Symposium, Decem-
ber 2008.
http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/
2009/retrieve.php?pdfid=401
Barry Eichengreen’s text, much more selective,
shorter and written in a plain language, points
out two basic factors:
The role of deregulation, from commissions
to the derogation of restrictions imposed by the
Glass-Steagall Act, which had been making a
clear distinction between trade and investment
banking in the US after the experience of the
crisis in the 1930s. Instead of creating a banking
model closer to the European one, it led to new
formulas (including the one called «shadow
financial system» by other sources) with a
stronger trend towards leveraging to generate
more income.
Excess savings detected in China (with some
savings rates indicators at 50% of GDP) and
other economies. It is sought to place funds in
public debt and assimilable assets (Fannie Mae
and Freddy Mac bonds) in a safe way. This
helped reduce the cost of leveraging in the
United States despite its low household savings
rate.
Eichengreen finishes with a message that
intends to be optimistic: human nature cannot
change, which includes greed, but if it has been
decisions on economic policy what has magni-
fied the crisis, there is room for correction for
the future.
EICHENGREEN, B. (2008): «Anatomy of a Crisis».
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1684
In a much more critical tone, Joseph Stiglitz
analyses the problems related with incentives
and information as well as new instruments
based on financial innovation and their
 perverse effects regarding microeconomic
 decisions and the macroeconomic impact as
well as implications related with regulation
and supervision requirements.
STIGLITZ, J. (2008). «The Financial Crisis of 2007/2008
and its Macroeconomic Consequences».
http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/
download/papers/2008_Financial_Crisis.pdf
A quite more favourable position towards
new developments (deregulation, innovation,
etc.) comes from Charles Calomiris, who
acknowledges some relevant «agency problems»
as a novelty. This applies to conflicts of interest
between decision-takers and those trusting
them: from less sophisticated investors to
shareholders, besides traditional asymmetric
information regarding the different degree
of risk knowledge between the parties to a
transaction.
CALOMIRIS, C. (2008): «Banking Crisis». National
Bureau of Economic Research, Research
 summary, 4.
http://www.nber.org/rporter/2008number4/
calomiris.html
John B. Taylor, sub-secretary of the Department
of the Treasury under George W. Bush, insists in
irresponsibility of monetary policy, which was
much more expansive than what could be
inferred from the famous «Taylor rule». He also
points out the convenience or need to go for
global inflation goals.
TAYLOR, J. (2009), «The Financial Crisis and the
Policy Responses: an Empirical Analysis of
What Went Wrong». NBER, working paper
14631.
The version of the speech at the Bank of Cana-
da can be found on:
http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/FCPR.pdf
Other contributions feature interesting
 opinions on the interaction between aspects
to the crisis – causes, development and
response – as well as between them and other
economic ideas.
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A short, relevant text by Daron Acemoglu intro-
duces an original summary of what went wrong
and what economists have learned with the
 crisis. Acemoglu points out three weaknesses:
Believing that aggregate volatility was over,
without noticing that more diversification could
be juxtaposed with more interconnection.
Ignoring the role of institutions, identifying
free markets with markets free from regulation.
Naïveness in believing that the reputation
of historical organisations (such as some
 symbolic investment banks) were a permanent
guarantee.
However, Acemoglu would not like the intellectual
and sociopolitical climate to lead to an extreme
that forgets the role of innovation and continuous
Schumpeterian reallocation of resources vis-à-
vis the most dynamic future developments as
mechanisms of prosperity.
ACEMOGLU D. (2009). «The Crisis of 2008: Struc-
tural Lessons for and from Economics». Centre
for Ecnomic Policy Research (CEPR), Policy In-
sight, 28 January. 
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/PolicyInsights/
PolicyInsight28.pdf
Michael Bordo also points out the role of crises
as a source of institutional reform, mentioning
the risk of an interventionist and regulatory
pendulum movement he calls a potential
 «government overkill».
BORDO, M. (2008). «An Historical Perspective of the
Crisis of 2007-2008». National Bureau of
 Economic Research, working paper 14569.
http://michael.bordo.googlepages.com/
Axel Leijonhufvud, the author of a 1968 reinter-
pretation of John M. Keynes, explains how
 theoretical mechanisms of return to balance by
which the economy and markets work feature
exceptions requiring intervention. This relates to
the Keynesian argument that automatic market
mechanisms are not effective in bringing about
recovery out of recession. Leijonhufvud points
out two factors:
Abundant foreign savings numbed the signs
sent out by the reduction in domestic savings
(which would have led to higher interest rates).
At the same time, the input of cheap import
goods disguised inflationary pressure – inade-
quately measured by the consumer price index
– also causing higher interest rates.
Vulnerable leveraging in the light of herding,
which requires regulation.
LEIJONHUFVUD, A. (2009). «Fixing the Crisis: Two
Systemic Problems». voxeu.org, 12 January.
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2784
Ricardo Caballero analyses the role of demand
of top-quality assets for economies with a sur-
plus but also for other more structural sources
of demand like old-age benefit coverage, which
will persist after the crisis. This demand led to
lower interest rates but also to generate an offer
of assets qualified as «synthetic AAA», with a
rather more macroeconomic than individual
degree of risk. The author also insists in the key
role so-called «Knight’s uncertainty» has played
in the crisis, going far beyond statistically
processable risk, as well as in the need of gov-
ernments, especially the American, providing
guarantees the private finance sector cannot in
such uncertainty.
CABALLERO, R. (2009). «A Global Perspective on
the Great Financial Insurance Run». voxeu.org,
23 January.
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2827
What are the lessons experience from other
crises teaches? What patterns are repeated and
which are new? Among the numerous related
studies stand out by Carmen Reinhart and
Kenneth Rogoff, who in January 2008 made a
first serious comparative analysis in which they
showed the role of the lending boom compared
to episodes of lending without guarantees.
When the phenomenon occurred in developing
economies, it led to harsh criticism of lacking
Change of cycle or change of model?224
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institutional quality, but now they were occurring
in the heart of the most developed financial
systems. The subject is deepened in REINHART,
C. and ROGOFF, K., 2009.
Acknowledging that the present crisis has a
wider scope than the average of analysed crises
– related to both its size and its international
outreach, though with a potential role of
adopted policies in smoothening the impact –
the lessons history teaches talk of production
decline at around 9% – with recession lasting
roughly two years and, in the case of unem-
ployment, four years – and a fall in housing
prices at 35% (over 6 years) and stock markets
at 55% (over more than three years). Another
result is the increase of public debt (at around
86%), which adds to concerns about the cost
all this will have for future generations and
the increasing cost to be absorbed by financial
markets.
REINHART, C. and ROGOFF, K (2009). «The After-
math of Financial Crises». National Bureau of
Economic Research, working paper 14656. Pre-
vious text:
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/
rogoff/files/Aftermath.pdf
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